Abstract. In the simplified formal treatment proposed in this paper, a decrease in a policy parameter -the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP -can monotonically increase long-term growth rate and may lead to a higher employment level. This notwithstanding, the paper shows that the redistributive implications of such a decrease may induce the wage earners to oppose it. As a consequence, policy-makers reflecting social preferences may undertake redistributive transfers generating persistent unemployment and lowering growth even if commitment technologies allowing them to follow preannounced tax policies were feasible.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, it has become increasingly common to hear economists, commentators and public officials claiming that the low employment rate and the disappointing growth performance of continental Europe vis-à-vis the United States (see Tables 1 and 2 ) have to be attributed -among other factors -to the more generous welfare system and heavier tax burden of the former (see Table 3 ). The obvious policy implication of this claim for countries like France, Germany or Italy is that they should implement structural reforms aimed at reducing both the amount of redistribution operated through the welfare system and the associated tax burden if they want to raise employment and stimulate investment (see Table 4 ), thus enhancing long-term growth. Hence, those advocating the urgency of these reforms argue that the wage earners' organizations and political representa-tives opposing them are myopic, as they do not fully appreciate the long-term benefits that even their constituency can enjoy if the economy grows persistently at higher rates. In contrast, this paper presents a simple generalequilibrium endogenous growth model, which follows the classical dichotomy in dividing the population between capitalists ( proprietors of the productive assets) and workers, and where it may be perfectly rational from the viewpoint of a wage earner to oppose these reforms even if they lead to higher employment and boost long-term growth. Indeed, it is shown that workers may have good reasons to resist a cut in the share of GDP devoted to redistributive transfers in their favor even in a set-up where (i) they take into account the future benefits accruing to them (or to their descendants) in case of higher growth, and (ii) this cut has an unambiguously positive effect on employment and growth. In other words, even conceding that these reforms will permanently raise the employment level and improve the growth performance of the economy, and even assessing that their effects on workers' well-being should be evaluated in a very long-term perspective, their redistributive implications might be such that workers could be better off if they are not implemented. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that these reforms can be against the interests of the current workers even if they provide that cuts in redistributive transfers shall be implemented only in the future. This is at odds with those concluding that the welfare state would survive only if social and political actors cannot commit themselves to implement in the future what they decide in the present. Indeed, the model presented here also shows that policy-makers reflecting the interests of both the capitalists and the workers may implement permanent redistributive transfers in favor of the workers no matter whether a commitment technology is feasible.
Finally, in this set-up, an increase of the workers' influence on the political process may raise the fraction of GDP allocated to finance the welfare state, thus leading to a higher unemployment rate and to a lower growth rate. If, in a democratic society, the political influence of a social group depends on its relative size, this implies in the model that unemployment may increase as firms' ownership is concentrated in the hands of a smaller fraction of total population.
The results outlined above are obtained both by assuming that all the workers receive some benefit (monetary transfers, welfare entitlements etc.) from the government and by assuming that only the unemployed workers receive it. The basic model is also extended to the case in which the proprietors of the productive assets are part of the workforce and thus eligible to receive government benefits: it is not surprising that in this case -where the entire population is entitled to receive some benefit from the government -we obtain a politico-economic equilibrium in which a larger share of national product is devoted to finance the welfare state.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature; Section 3 presents the basic model where all workers may receive transfers by the government; Section 4 derives the optimal tax rates; and Section 5 extends the basic model to the case in which only the unemployed workers may receive transfers and to the case in which the capital owners belong to the workforce. Section 6 concludes.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
The link between economic growth and fiscal policy modeled in the paper depends on the depressing impact on the rate of return to private investment that more massive redistributive transfers can cause by increasing the tax rate Fiscal Transfers and Distributive Conflict r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 and the wage pressure. The former mechanism has been emphasized by the literature studying the effects of tax policy in growth models (see McGrattan and Schmitz, 1999; Rebelo, 1991; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995) , the latter by those focusing on the so-called 'labor-market channel' (see Alesina et al., 2002) , namely on the proposition that high public spending and taxation reduces profits and investment by putting upward pressure on private sector wages. Indeed, fiscal redistribution can distort labor-supply incentives, 1 by affecting the ratio between the income conditional on working and the income conditional on not working (see Phelps, 1997; Pissarides, 1998) . Hence, the model presented in this paper is consistent with the literature emphasizing that higher public transfers and taxation tend to raise both the real wages and the capital-labor ratio, and to lower both the employment rate and the expected return on capital, thus depressing investment and growth (see Daveri and Tabellini, 2000) . In this sense, the model addresses the negative incentive effects that redistribution has at both the giving end (by raising taxes) and at the receiving end (by discouraging labor-market participation). Within this framework, the paper vindicates the intuition according to which the wage earners can be right in resisting a cut in welfare programs and taxation, as they appropriate only a portion of the fruits of the higher growth made possible by the cut, while bearing its entire impact in terms of less favorable income distribution.
The possibility of generating unemployment is an original feature of the model presented here. To the best of my knowledge, indeed, no other paper modeling how redistributive policies are determined and affect growth deals with the presence of unemployment.
2 This allows the present model to predict that where the workers have a relevant influence on the political process, it is more likely that the amount of redistribution operated through the fiscal policy can create persistent unemployment. This paper follows Lansing (1999) in studying the significant case of capitalists' log-utility and in obtaining the result that -differently than in Judd (1985) -the open-loop solution to the social planner's problem does not entail zero redistributive transfers in the long run. This result is important, as Judd (1985) is at the origin of the conclusion that the perpetuation of government transfers would constitute a 'political failure' (see Hassler et al., 2003 ; see also Besley and Coate, 1998 , for the definition of 'political failure'), which is due to the lack of mechanisms committing the policy-makers to follow the optimal -but time-inconsistent -fiscal policy dictating zero redistributive transfers in the future. In contrast -and as in Lansing (1999) the open-loop solution to the social planner's problem obtained in the 1. See Bourguignon (2001) . Prescott (2003) provides some evidence on the role of taxes in explaining the differences between the United States and continental Europe in labor supply across time. 2. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) present a model aimed at studying how taxes on labor and capital affect both unemployment and growth. However, they take the tax rates as given, as their scope is not modeling how redistributive policies are determined. present paper is also time consistent. 3 This makes the analysis more realistic, in the light of the mentioned lack of effective mechanisms committing the fiscal authorities to implement preannounced policies.
The simple politico-economic process modeled here predicts that more inequality may lead to more redistribution. This is common to Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Benabou (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) . 4 However, differently than in these papers, where more inequality has to be intended as a lower ratio of the median voter's wealth to the average wealth, in the present paper more inequality means that the ownership of the productive assets is concentrated in the hands of a smaller fraction of total population.
THE BASIC MODEL
In the economy under consideration, there are firms, capitalists, workers and the government. The capitalists do not work and are the proprietors of the assets used by the firms for production, while the workers do not save. This classical dichotomy can be micro-founded by assuming 'that capitalists are on a corner of their labor supply decision due to their wealth, leisure being a normal good, and workers find neither saving nor borrowing valuable because of the transactions costs associated with small transactions' ( Judd, 1985, p. 84) . Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. Although individuals have finite lives, the model considers immortal extended families ('dynasties'). All markets are perfectly competitive. Expectations are rational, in the sense that they are consistent with the true processes followed by the relevant variables. In this framework, in which there is no source of random disturbances, this implies perfect foresight.
The firms
There is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms. The only good produced in this economy is Y t , which is the numéraire of the system. Each firm produces this single good according to the technology
3. This differentiates the formal set-up presented here from the politico-economic model developed by Park and Philippopoulos (2003) , which focuses on time-inconsistent openloop solutions. 4. In contrast with the hypothesis that inequality reduces growth because inequality increases redistribution, Benabou (1996) emphasizes that measures of redistribution are consistently positive in cross-country growth regressions. Along similar lines, Aghion et al. (1999) note that redistribution has been found to increase -not decrease -growth rates, suggesting that these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that redistribution creates investment opportunities for those unable to borrow sufficient capital in the presence of imperfect capital markets.
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5 Finally, consistently with Frankel (1962) , it is supposed that although A t is endogenous to the economy, each private agent takes it as given in its decision, as a single agent's decision has only a negligible effect on the aggregate stock of capital.
The capital stock evolves according to
where I t is gross investment and where -for simplicity and without loss of generality -it is assumed to be full capital depreciation (d 5 1). In each t the representative firm maximizes its net (after taxes) profits p t with respect to the choice of labor and capital. Assuming that firms' revenues are taxed, the period net (after taxes) profits p t of a firm are given by
where t t is the tax rate, W t is the (real) wage and R t is the (real) rental rate on capital.
Firms' optimality conditions with respect to the choice of labor and capital are, respectively,
and
Given (4), it is apparent that the net profits of an optimizing firm are zero ( p t 5 0).
The capitalists
The 'capitalists' are the owners of the capital stock. Each capitalist is the proprietor of an equal share of the productive assets existing in the economy, which are rented in each period to the firms. Moreover, the capitalists take account of the welfare and resources of their actual and perspective descendants. Indeed, following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , this intergenerational interaction is modeled by imaging that the current generation maximizes utility and incorporates a budget constraint over an infinite 5. Consistent with this formal set-up, one can interpret technological progress as laboraugmenting.
future. 6 Finally, the number of these dynasties of capitalists is supposed to remain constant over time (and normalized to unity).
The representative capitalist's problem amounts to deciding a contingency plan for consumption C t , L t and K t þ 1 in order to maximize
subject to
where y is a time-preference parameter.
The workers
For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the working population is constant and that its size is N. Moreover, it is assumed that workers are identical and that they do not save. A worker's period utility is given by
where G t is the workers' non-labor income (namely the monetized value of the welfare entitlements and government transfers made to all workers in period t) and Z41 captures the fact that a worker can enjoy more leisure (and/ or undertake some non-market activity) when she/he is not employed. It is implicitly assumed that each worker is endowed with one unit of time and that time is indivisible: either the entire unit is supplied as labor or none of it is supplied (see Rogerson, 1988) . As workers are identical, this implies that at W t o(Z À 1)G t aggregate labor supply is zero (no worker is willing to work). Hence, it is apparent that market forces simultaneously determine W t and L t in such a way that one has or W t 4(Z À 1)G t entailing L t 5 N (full employment), or L t oN entailing W t 5 (Z À 1)G t . In the presence of unemployment (L t oN), one may think that the workers to be employed are selected at random.
6. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 60) 
The government
The government provides the same transfers and/or welfare entitlements to all workers and must balance its budget in each period. Hence,
4. DETERMINATION OF THE TAX RATES
Labor-market equilibrium
The firms' optimality condition with respect to the choice of the labor input in (4a) implies that labor demand is
As the tax rate exceeds the threshold t ¼ a=ða þ Z À 1Þ, there is unemployment, 7 and the equilibrium level of employment decreases with t t . Indeed, equilibrium in the labor market implies
where the employment level decreases monotonically with t t whenever t t > t. Considering (4a) and (10), the equilibrium real wage is
Capital accumulation along an equilibrium path
By solving the intertemporal problem of the representative capitalist (see Appendix A), one obtains the difference equation governing the equilibrium motion of the capital stock for a given trajectory of t t :
from which one can verify that the growth rate of K t is monotonically decreasing in the tax rate:
7. It is not surprising that the threshold t decreases with Z, namely with the utility that workers can enjoy by undertaking some non-market activity.
Whenever t tþ1 5 t t 5 t (hence, along a balanced growth path), one can easily check that the economy's rate of growth is monotonically decreasing in t:
Capitalists' optimal tax rate
Suppose that the tax rates were set caring only about the capitalists' interests ('plutocracy'; see Hassler et al., 2003) , namely suppose that the government decides in t on the fiscal transfers by solving
subject to 0rt s r1 and to ð12Þ;
It is trivial that the capitalists' optimal sequence of tax rates t
The capitalists would prefer that the welfare entitlements and the government transfers in favor of the workers will be suppressed, so as to avoid the tax burden financing the public outlays and the upward pressure on the wage due to the non-labor income enjoyed by the workers.
Workers' optimal tax rate
In contrast, it is not generally the case that rational workers prefer to suppress any redistributive public intervention. Indeed, they may face a tradeoff between taking possession of a larger share of national product thanks to increases in the redistributive tax and benefiting from a more rapid capital accumulation thanks to a lower tax. The possible existence of this tradeoff can be verified by solving the problem of a social planner caring only about the workers' well-being ('dictatorship of the proletariat'; see Hassler et al., 2003) :
sÀt uðÁÞ subject to 0rt s r1 and to ð12Þ; K t given; 0 < x < 1 ð17Þ
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The workers' optimal sequence of tax rates t
is such that (see Appendix A for the derivation):
where one has persistent unemployment if 1 À a À x > t. 8 Note that (19) is both the time-consistent and the open-loop solution to (17): it solves the workers' problem no matter whether they have or do not have the possibility to commit themselves credibly to following a preannounced tax policy. 9 Therefore, the following proposition holds: Proposition 1. (i) It can be perfectly rational (whenever 1 À a À x40) for the workers to oppose any reform of the welfare state imposing in the present and/or in the future a reduction of the share of national product that is redistributed to them below a certain critical threshold (1 À a À x), although this reduction (if permanent) boosts output growth, and (ii) there exists a conflict (whenever 1 À a À x40) between capitalists and workers over the determination of the size of the welfare state (and the tax rate necessary to finance it).
Proof. Given that (19) solves (17), it is trivial that any reduction of t s below t W brings about a fall in the lifetime utility of the representative dynasty of workers. Moreover, by considering (14) it is apparent that any tot W entails r(t)4r(t W ). Hence, (i) is demonstrated. Finally, by comparing (16) and (19), it is straightforward that whenever 1 À a À x40 one has t C ot W , thus demonstrating (ii). & 8. Notice that having assumed full capital depreciation (d 5 1), a plausible calibration of the other parameter values should require the assignment of a relatively low value to the timepreference parameters y and x. 9. This is due to the absence in this set-up of the influence that future tax policy may have on current investors' behavior via anticipation effects (see Lansing, 1999) .
Authority's optimal tax rate
Let us assume next that the government decides on the fiscal policy by maximizing a welfare function that takes into account the well-being of both the capitalists and the workers. In other words, let the government decide in t on the fiscal transfers by solving
g subject to 0rt s r1 and to ð12Þ; f > 0; K t given
where for simplicity we assume x 5 y and where u(Á) is given by (18). The parameter f measures the weight that the workers have on the political decision process vis-à-vis the capitalists. In the special case in which f 5 N, the government maximizes a utilitarian welfare function, which is the sum of individual utilities. This special case captures the idea that, in a democratic society, the influence exerted by each social group on public choices tends to reflect its relative size, so that the weight that the fiscal authority assigns in its welfare criterion to the utility of the representative member of each group is equal to the number of individuals belonging to that group. The authority's optimal sequence of tax rates t
is such that (see Appendix A for the derivation; also see footnote 8):
where one has persistent unemployment if t < ½ð1 À a À xÞf À a=ðf þ 1Þ. Again, (21) is both the time-consistent and the open-loop solution to (20) (see footnote 9). Therefore, the following propositions hold:
Proposition 2. When the workers gain more influence on the political process (f becomes larger), (i) persistent unemployment may be created (if ½ð1 À a À xÞf À a=ðf þ 1Þ goes beyond the threshold t as a consequence of the increase in f) or exacerbated (if ½ð1 À a À xÞf À a=ðf þ 1Þ was already beyond t), and (ii) the equilibrium rate of growth may be depressed
Proof. Considering (10), (14), (21) and the fact that ½ð1 À a À xÞf À a=ðf þ 1Þ increases with f, it is apparent that (i) and (ii) Proposition 3. The 'survival of the welfare state', namely the persistence of redistributive policies depressing growth and creating unemployment, does not reflect any 'institutional failure', i.e. it is not due to the policy-makers' impossibility to commit themselves credibly to following preannounced policies.
Proof. The fact that (21) is both the time-consistent and the open-loop solution to (20) rules out the possibility that the emergence and the persistence of tax rates and government transfers lowering the growth rate and the employment level can be due to the lack of an appropriate commitment technology. & If in a democratic society the political influence of a social group depends on its relative size, Proposition 2 implies that the unemployment rate may tend to increase as the ownership of the productive assets is concentrated in the hands of a smaller fraction of total population. In its turn, Proposition 3 can be interpreted by arguing that, even if it were possible to implement mechanisms whereby governments can credibly commit themselves and their successors to follow preannounced policies, the negative effects on growth of the distributive conflict typical of a capitalistic economy could hardly be eliminated.
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
In this section, we maintain that the proprietors of the productive assets are only a part of the society's members, but we suppose that the government's transfers in favor of the workforce take the form of unemployment benefits. We consider both the case where -as in the basic model -the workforce is a portion of the total population while the proprietors of the productive assets -which constitute the rest of the population -are not in the workforce, and the case where the workforce coincides with the entire population but only a fraction of it holds productive assets. Thus, in the latter case, there are workers who save and accumulate capital. As in the preceding sections, the number of individuals with no asset is N, while the number of firms and proprietors of productive assets is still normalized to be one. In this section, the period utility function of an individual who is in the workforce but has no asset is the following:
where B t is the benefit paid by the government to each unemployed worker.
10
Similar to the preceding sections, one has that at W t oB t aggregate labor 10. Note that the same income level is assumed to give to an individual the same utility, no matter whether she/he is employed or not.
supply is zero (no worker is willing to work). Hence, it is apparent that market forces simultaneously determine W t and L t in such a way that one has or W t 4B t entailing full employment, or unemployment entailing W t 5 B t . Again, in the presence of unemployment one may think that the workers to be employed are selected at random. The firms' optimality condition with respect to the choice of the labor input is (4a), thus implying that the labor demand function is provided by (9).
Case where no worker saves
As in the preceding sections, the individuals belonging to the workforce do not save. As their number is N, the government must satisfy in each t
Equilibrium in the labor market is now given by
Note in (24) that unemployment arises whenever the government operates some redistribution: different from (10) where unemployment emerges only when t t > t, in (24) it is sufficient to have t t > 0 for generating unemployment.
Equations (11)- (14) still give, respectively, the equilibrium real wage, the law of motion of the capital stock, the growth rate of the capital stock and the rate of economic growth consistent with t tþ1 5 t t 5 t, where one has to consider that L(t t ) is now given by (24) .
If the tax rates were set caring only about the capitalists' interests, we would again obtain (16): the capitalists would prefer that the welfare entitlements and the government transfers in favor of the workers were suppressed.
In contrast, if the tax rates were set caring only about the workers' interests, the optimal policy would still be the time-consistent and open-loop solution to (17), where uðÁÞ ¼ lnfK s ½Lðt s Þ aÀ1 að1 À t s Þg with L(t s ) given by (24). One can also verify that the conclusions summarized in Proposition 1 still hold. 11. In the presence of unemployment benefits, the tax policy solving (17) becomes
In its turn, Proposition 1 becomes: (i) it can be perfectly rational (whenever 1 À 2a À x40) for the workers to oppose any reform of the welfare state imposing in the present and/or in the future a reduction of the share of national product that is redistributed to them below a certain critical threshold (1 À 2a À x), although this reduction (if permanent) boosts output growth, and (ii) there exists a conflict (whenever 1 À 2a À x40) between capitalists and workers over the determination of the size of the welfare state (and the tax rate necessary to finance it).
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Again, (25) is both the time-consistent and the open-loop solution to the government's problem. Moreover, the conclusions summarized in Proposition 2 13 and in Proposition 3 still apply.
Case where a portion of the workforce saves
We assume here that all the N þ 1 individuals populating the economy belong to the workforce. However, only a portion of them (normalized to be one) are the proprietors of the productive assets. Hence, the representative capital owner maximizes (5) subject to
In this case, the government's budget constraint is
Again, in (28) it is sufficient to have t t 40 for generating unemployment. Equation (11) still gives the equilibrium real wage, where now one has to consider that L(t t ) is given by (28).
Contrary to the other cases discussed in the paper, the capitalists' current decisions on capital investment depend on future governments' policies. 14 12. The derivation follows the same procedure given in Appendix A for the case discussed in the preceding sections. 13. In this case, Proposition 2 can be stated as follows: when the workers gain more influence on the political process (f becomes larger), (i) persistent unemployment may be created (if (1 À a À x)f À a(2 þ f) becomes strictly positive as a consequence of the increase in f) or exacerbated (if (1 À a À x)f À a(2 þ f) was already strictly positive), and (ii) the equilibrium rate of growth may be depressed (if (1 À a À x)f4a(2 þ f)). 14. This is because the change in future utilities due to a marginal increment in current capital investment is affected by the income that the proprietors of productive assets have as members of the workforce.
Therefore, the optimal open-loop policies of the government are not time consistent. Given the lack of effective mechanisms whereby governments can credibly commit themselves and their successors to follow preannounced policies over a long time horizon, we focus the analysis on time-consistent policies.
The optimal time-consistent policy of a government caring only about the capitalists' interests would be (16): even if the proprietors of the productive assets can benefit from the welfare state, they would still suppress any taxation and government transfer.
In contrast, the optimal time-consistent policy of a government caring about the interests of both the proprietors of productive assets and the portion of population without assets can be obtained by solving in each t the following problem:
and taking into account the optimizing behavior of capitalists and future governments, where again it is assumed that x 5 y. The solution to (29) -together with the optimal investment policy of the capitalists -can be derived as the subgame-perfect equilibrium policy of the game between the fiscal authorities and the capitalists.
15 Therefore, along an equilibrium path, the motion of the capital stock, the rate of economic growth and the tax rate are given by
15. The derivation follows the same procedure given in Section A.3 for the case discussed in the preceding sections.
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By comparing the equilibrium path emerging when the optimal tax rate is t B with the equilibrium path emerging when it is t D , one may reach the following conclusions:
Proposition 4. In the case in which the government's transfers in favor of those in the workforce take the form of unemployment benefits, (i) the 'survival of the welfare state' is more likely when the entire population is entitled to benefit by the transfers rather than when only a portion of the population may benefit by them, and (ii) the tax rate and the unemployment rate are higher when the entire population is entitled to benefit by the transfers than when only a portion of the population may benefit by them.
Proof. By inspecting (25) and (32), one can verify that t D 5 0 entails t B 5 0, but Proposition 4 can be generalized by emphasizing the simple intuition underlying it: when a larger fraction of the population is entitled to receive some benefit from government, one should expect a politico-economic equilibrium in which a larger share of national product is devoted to finance the welfare state.
CONCLUSION
This paper aims at providing an original and unified view of redistribution, growth and unemployment, which are usually tackled separately. Indeed, it
16. The optimal time-consistent policy of a government caring only about the interests of that fraction of population without productive assets is the following:
17. To verify that whenever t B 40, then t D 4t B , consider that -by inspecting (25) and (32) -one can see that t B 40 entails t D 40, where t B is that value of t satisfying the first-order condition i(t) À u(t) 5 0 and t D is that value of t satisfying the first-order condition i(t) À o(t) 5 0. Since diðtÞ=dt < 0 and u(t)4o(t)40 for any given value of t, it is necessarily the case that t D 4t B .
offers a simplified formal treatment where the reduction of government transfers in favor of the workers allows to decrease the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP, thus monotonically increasing the growth rate and leading to a lower unemployment rate. This notwithstanding, the paper shows that the redistributive implications of such a decrease may induce some society's members to oppose it. As a consequence, policy-makers reflecting social preferences may undertake these transfers even if commitment technologies allowing them to follow preannounced tax policies were feasible. Persistent unemployment and slow growth may be the outcome of this politicoeconomic process, taking place in an institutional framework where trade unions are absent and all private agents act competitively. Indeed, the fact that the results of the paper are obtained within this framework is significant as it may suggest that a reduction of the unions' power in wage determination is not crucial for combating persistent unemployment and enhancing growth. However, the possible unions' role in the politico-economic process determining the redistributive policies in favor of the workers and affecting the growth performance of the economy deserves further research.
APPENDIX A

A.1. Optimal capital accumulation
One can derive the optimal accumulation rule of the representative capitalist by backward induction. Supposing that there is a final period T, it is straightforward that in T the representative capitalist would set K Tþ1 5 0. Hence, the problem to be solved in T À 1 by each capitalist is the following:
for exogenously given paths of t t , A t and W t , K TÀ1 given. The necessary (and sufficient) condition for a maximum is
from which one can obtain the optimal decision rule: Given (A.1), the problem to be solved in T À 2 by the representative capitalist is:
for exogenously given paths of t t , A t and W t , K TÀ2 given. The necessary (and sufficient) condition for a maximum is
from which one can obtain the optimal decision rule:
Iterating this procedure j times and letting T ! 1 and j ! 1, one obtains the optimal (time-invariant) rule: with respect to t t , K tþ1 and the Lagrange multiplier l t , where 0 t s 1, and c is a dummy variable such that c 5 0 under the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and c 5 1 when the fiscal authority cares about both the capitalists and the workers.
For an interior solution to (A.4) consistent with full employment, the following conditions must be satisfied: From system (A.5), one can derive the difference equation in t t that an interior solution to (A.4) consistent with full employment must satisfy: It is easy to verify that only this path can be an equilibrium trajectory in a neighborhood of t ¼ ½fð1 À a À xÞ À ac=½ð1 À aÞðf þ cÞ.
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Similarly, for an interior solution to (A.13) consistent with the presence of unemployment, the following condition must be satisfied:
Given (A.14), one can compute the optimal tax rate in T: Given (A.15) and the capitalists' decision rule (A.1), the problem to be solved in T À 1 by the authority is the following:
where D is a constant whose value depends on the parameters. For an interior solution to (A.16) consistent with full employment, the following condition must be satisfied: 
